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Sexual Politics and Social Change
DARREN LENARD HUTCHINSON
The Article examines the impact of social movement activity upon the
advancement of GLBT rights. It analyzes the state and local strategy that
GLBT social movements utilized to alter the legal status of sexual
orientation and sexuality following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bowers
v. Hardwick. Successful advocacy before state and local courts, human
rights commissions, and legislatures fundamentally shifted public opinion
and laws regarding sexual orientation and sexuality between Bowers and
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. Texas. This altered landscape
created the “political opportunity” for the Lawrence ruling and made the
opinion relatively “safe.”
Currently, GLBT rights groups are following a similar strategy with
respect to the pursuit of same-sex marriage. This Article evaluates that
strategy and considers whether political opportunities for reform in GLBT
rights exist on the national stage.
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Sexual Politics and Social Change
DARREN LENARD HUTCHINSON∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Social movements are essential for the achievement of legal and
political change. A “social movement” is an organized and sustained
political effort to alter the substance of policy and public opinion on
matters of interest to the movement’s participants.1 In recent years, a
growing body of scholarship among constitutional law scholars examines
the relationship between social movement activity and the evolution of
Supreme Court doctrine. Reva Siegel, for example, connects changes in
the Court’s treatment of sex-based discrimination to feminist organizing
and shifting gender roles in the post-World War II era.2 And Michael
Klarman has written extensive accounts on the relationship between the
Civil Rights Movement, Southern backlash, and progressive changes in the
status of blacks before the law.3
The work of these scholars depicts Court doctrine in a much more
complicated fashion than many traditional accounts, which contend that
judicial review conflicts with democratic governance.4 Although Supreme
Court justices are indeed unelected and have lifetime tenure, their rulings,
particularly on matters of broad social concern, respond to Congress, the
President and public opinion.5 Because social movements can impact the
opinion of members of Congress, the President, the electorate, and
individual judges, they can also indirectly and directly inform the

∗
Professor, American University, Washington College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School; B.A.
University of Pennsylvania. Editor, Dissenting Justice: http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com.
1
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy and
Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 73–74 (2005) (discussing social movements).
2
See generally Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
3
See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (discussing limits on
Supreme Court as an instrument of racial justice and linking most effective changes to politics and
social movement actors).
4
Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 5–12 (discussing antidemocracy critiques of judicial review).
5
See generally Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 16 n.95 (listing numerous sources linking Supreme
Court rulings with public opinion); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943,
1984–2004 (2003) (discussing Congressional impact on Court’s treatment of sex-based discrimination);
Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
363 (discussing presidential influence on judicial elaboration of constitutional norms).
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perspectives of courts and reshape constitutional law. Consequently,
social movements have an important role in doctrinal evolution.
Social movements have lobbied for and effectuated political and
doctrinal changes in the context of racial justice and gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgender (GLBT) rights.7 But to the extent that the public—or
social movements themselves—embraces relatively moderate positions on
matters related to race and sexuality, the Court will likely produce rulings
that reflect a centrist perspective—even though the Court is often seen as a
strong protector of disparaged social groups from majoritarian bias and
maltreatment.8
In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the Court anchored its ruling
around dominant public opinion concerning GLBT rights, even as it
reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, which reflected pernicious stereotypes of
and distaste for same-sex intimacy.9 For example, the Court justified its
decision to invalidate the state’s antisodomy statute in part because most
states had decriminalized sodomy by court rulings or statutory repeal.10
GLBT social movements played a central role in the decriminalization of
sodomy because they litigated several of the state cases that overturned the
statutes.11 GLBT rights groups also developed relationships with state
legislators who, seeking support from organized political organizations,
took liberal stances on GLBT rights.12 Thus, social movements influenced
the outcome in Lawrence by engaging in political activity that
fundamentally altered the legal status of GLBT individuals after Hardwick.
My current research considers the prospect for legal change in the area
of sexual orientation jurisprudence and legislation in the near future. My
interest in this topic reflects an ongoing appreciation of the impact of social
and political factors upon Court doctrine. It also responds to changes in
the nation’s political landscape brought by the election of President Barack
6
See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1418 (“Over the course of American history, groups seeking
constitutional change have worked to move one branch of federal or state government to dispute
questions of constitutional meaning with another, in an effort to make dissenting constitutional claims
audible, and ultimately, to secure for them the force of law.”).
7
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 419, 423–59 (2001) (discussing the role of law in fortifying social movement activity in
antiracist, feminist, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender contexts).
8
See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 32–72 (discussing majoritarian influences on Court’s race and
sexual orientation jurisprudence).
9
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–78 (2003), rev’g Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
10
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“The 25 states with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct
referenced in . . . Bowers . . . are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct.”).
11
See, e.g., Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Fighting Sodomy Laws With a Record of
Success and Decades of Expertise, http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/199.pdf (last visited May 1, 2009).
12
See Kenneth D. Wald et al., The Politics of Gay Rights in American Communities: Explaining
Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1152 (1996) (discussing state and
municipal politics of gay rights organizations).
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Obama and the “Democratic sweep” of Congress, state legislatures, and
gubernatorial elections.
This Article considers whether the recent election has created a
“political opportunity”13 for liberal social movements to create substantial
changes in the legal status of GLBT individuals nationally and locally.
Currently, debates over same-sex marriage dominate questions of gay and
lesbian equality. Recent rulings by the highest courts in California,14
Connecticut,15 Iowa,16 and Massachusetts17 hold that state laws which
prohibit same-sex marriage violate those states’ constitutions.
Californians, however, amended the state constitution to reverse the court’s
ruling,18 and voters in Florida and Arizona also passed constitutional
amendments defining marriage in heterosexual terms.19 Although the issue
of same-sex marriage warrants attention due to the important equal
protection concerns it presents, in the past, pursuit of this right led to a
political backlash that ultimately limited GLBT rights. Currently,
advocacy for same-sex marriage—though successful in a few “blue” and
“purple” states—does not present the optimal opportunity for GLBT-social
movement success in terms of federal court litigation or legislation.
Nevertheless, the attainment of same-sex marriage in states where the
political opportunity for marriage equality exists could help reshape the
landscape of national politics, just as the move to decriminalize sodomy
altered national politics following Hardwick. These incremental changes
could, therefore, support a long-term strategy that seeks to legalize samesex marriage as a matter of federal constitutional law.
This Article takes a moderate or careful position on the prospect of
progress in the area of GLBT rights and equality, and it encourages GLBT
social movements to center their advocacy on political issues that present
13
See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY,
1930–1970 41 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine
the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in
political opportunities”); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT 85 (1994) (“By political opportunity
structure, I mean consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their
expectations for success or failure.”); see also Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 74 (“Political, social,
economic, and cultural forces shape the potential success or failure of social movement activism. If an
event or set of events disrupts political institutions and makes them more receptive to the agendas of
social movements, then a “political opportunity” exists for successful activism.”).
14
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
15
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
16
Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 WL 874044, at *29 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009).
17
Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
18
Jessica Garrison et al., Election 2008: Gay Marriage; Nation Watches as State Weighs Ban;
Prop. 8 Battle Drew Money and Attnetion from Across the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
19
Jay Hamburg, Florida Bans Same-Sex Marriage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2008, at B1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, ORSENT File; Mary Jo Pitzl, Voters Approve Proposal to Ban Gay
Marriage, AZCENTRAL.COM, Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/
azelections/articles/2008/11/05/20081105elect-propositions.html.
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the greatest opportunities for progress. This Article proceeds in three
parts. Part II examines the relationship between social movement political
advocacy and litigation and the evolution of the legal status of GLBT
persons. Part III argues that while the recent Democratic sweep in the
United States electoral landscape suggests broad opportunities for liberal
changes in the legal status of GLBT individuals, social movements should
resist this idea. Although several commentators argue that the shifting
political landscape indicates that a new liberal coalition has emerged in the
country, this proposition is unsubstantiated and is called into question by
several factors—including the success of anti-gay initiatives in states that
voted for Democratic candidates. Part IV argues that progress on GLBT
issues will depend upon the presence of a number of political and social
factors that have historically led to legal and political change, including
domestic and international political protest, economic concerns, and the
desire of political elites to gain influence among voters and organized
sectors of the electorate—including social movements. Part IV also argues
that despite the legalization of same-sex marriage through judicial rulings
and legislation in Iowa, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont, these
examples cannot serve as models for national action due to the unique
political conditions in these states. Marriage equality advocates, however,
should continue pursuing strategies in states where political opportunities
for successful advocacy exist. This local strategy could serve as the basis
for national change in the future. Finally, Part IV encourages GLBT social
movements to consider whether the current decline in the economy
presents an opportunity for them to challenge inequality with respect to
important economic benefits and employment.
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND COURT DOCTRINE
A. From Bowers to Lawrence: Social Movements Create Change
Bowers v. Hardwick was the first GLBT rights case decided by the
Supreme Court. Bowers held that the constitution does not “confer upon
homosexuals a right to engage in sodomy.”20 In Bowers, the Court applied
rational basis review and held that majoritarian notions of morality
supplied a rational basis for the anti-sodomy statute.21
Because it only applied rational basis review and narrowly framed the
liberty interest as “homosexual sodomy”—even though the law itself was
sex-neutral22—Bowers would later provide support for a broader set of
20

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986).
Id. at 196.
Thomas Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 648, 651–52 (1987) (“The two courts below dealt with the statute in its entirety; they made no
distinctions among categories of individuals subject to the prohibition on sodomy. The Supreme Court,
21
22
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laws and policies that discriminated against or denied the liberty of GLBT
people. In subsequent equal protection cases, for example, courts held that
because Bowers permits criminalization of the “conduct that defines the
class” of “homosexuals,” then gays and lesbians could not qualify as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class.23
The tone and substance of Bowers sent GLBT social movement actors
away from the federal system and to the states. Social movement actors
used state courts and legislatures as venues for advocating GLBT rights.24
They also lobbied for the liberalization of corporate antidiscrimination and
benefits policies.
These efforts resulted in the development of
antidiscrimination norms that protect GLBT individuals from
discrimination and to the reform of policies that had traditionally
distributed employee benefits based on concepts such as “marriage” that
inherently discriminate against GLBT individuals.25 The attainment of
GLBT rights at the state and local level and in the private sector
augmented the social status of gays and lesbians and helped to create an
alternative view of constitutional law and sexuality that would later lead to
the overruling of Bowers.26
As a result of localized social movement advocacy, when the Court
however, characterized the case as one concerning ‘the fundamental rights of homosexuals,’ and
specifically postponed the issue of the statute’s application to ‘other acts of sodomy.’”).
23
See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“It would be quite anomolous,
on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. . . . If the Court was unwilling to object to
state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to
conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious. After all, there can hardly
be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.”).
24
See Wald et al., supra note 12, at 1153–63 (discussing state and local politics of GLBT social
movements).
25
See Arthur S. Leonard, The Gay Rights Workplace Revolution, 30 HUM. RTS., Summer 2003, at
14, 16 (“By the 1990s, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force was reporting that a substantial
majority of the largest corporate employers had antidiscrimination policies, and in line with the newest
thinking some of them were also covering gender identity.”); Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the
Kulturkampf, Or, How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn’t,
49 DUKE L.J. 1559, 1599 (2000) (“The corporate world has, in the last decade, accorded greater
recognition to gay family units than ever before; according to a Human Rights Campaign report, at
least 2,856 private and public employers offered domestic partner health coverage as of August 1999—
compared with about two dozen in 1990.”).
26
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003), rev’d Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (“In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”).
In our own constitutional system the deficiencies in Bowers became even more
apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws
prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now
to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those
States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual
conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults
acting in private.
Id. at 573.
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decided Lawrence v. Texas, the political and legal landscape concerning
GLBT rights had changed substantially. For example, while more than
half of the states criminalized sodomy when the Court decided Bowers,
only thirteen did so when it issued its ruling in Lawrence.27 Also, only
four states, including Texas, criminalized same-sex sodomy when the
Court decided Lawrence.28
Furthermore, several foreign courts, including the European Court of
Human Rights, had already invalidated anti-sodomy laws, which indicated
to the Court that “Western civilization” had reached a new consensus
regarding the appropriateness of laws that criminalized private adult
consensual sexual relations.29 In addition, while Lawrence does not
explicitly rest on this fact, at the time of the ruling, opinion polls indicated
that a majority of the public opposed the criminalization of adult
consensual homosexual conduct.30
These legal and political developments did not go unnoticed by
members of the Court. Indeed, the majority opinion makes explicit
reference to the fundamental changes in the nature of GLBT rights in the
states and on the international stage that occurred between Bowers and
Lawrence.31 The opinion also discusses changes in foreign law, which
sparked a heated retort from Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion.32
The strategic choice by pro-gay social movements to pursue GLBT rights
within state and local governments helped to refashion the legal and
political landscape regarding sexuality and sexual orientation, which made
Lawrence a much “safer” ruling than Bowers.
B. Lawrence: Cabining Justice
Although public opinion and the structure of state law on the issue of
sodomy made Lawrence a safer ruling than Bowers, the Court nevertheless
cabined its decision in order to limit its reach and to protect the Court’s
legitimacy from erosion due to a potential conservative political
backlash.33 The Court, for example, stated that its ruling did not involve a
claim of a right to legal recognition of GLBT relationships,34 nor did it
27

Id.
Id.
29
See id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981)).
30
Neil A. Lewis, Conservatives Furious Over Court’s Direction, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at
A19, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (observing that polls show that majority of
Americans support legalizing consensual, adult homosexual conduct).
31
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–73.
32
Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33
I have analyzed this issue in a prior publication. See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 40–58
(discussing conservative dimensions of Lawrence).
34
See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (arguing that antigay sodomy statutes “seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals”); id. at 578 (noting that its ruling “does not
28

2009]

SEXUAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

1531

35

involve public sex or prostitution. The Court also strained to describe the
case as involving sex that was potentially part of an “enduring” “personal
bond”36 between the petitioners (who had actually been involved in a
casual escapade). The Court attempted to create “respectable” gay
“intimacy” by implying an intimate relationship between the parties
without going far enough to legitimize same-sex marriage and invite
criticism of its ruling.37
Predictably, Justice Kennedy, the moderate voice on the Court,
authored Lawrence (and Romer v. Evans). As some political scientists
have argued, public opinion tends to have the “most pronounced” impact
upon judicial moderates.38
The Court’s effort to distance Lawrence from same-sex marriage,
however, was unsuccessful. After the ruling, public support for same-sex
marriage decreased dramatically—even though the Court disclaimed the
notion that Lawrence would lead inevitably to judicial recognition of samesex marriage.39 Public support for same-sex marriage fell once again after
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated the state’s ban on
same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, an
opinion which explicitly cites to Lawrence.40 Conservatives effectively
used the rulings to mobilize voters against GLBT rights.41 Accurately
predicting that the cases presented a political opportunity for conservative
activism, President George W. Bush made same-sex marriage a campaign
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter”); id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (observing that “other reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group”).
35
Id. at 567 (arguing that sodomy laws affect “the most private human conduct . . . in the most
private of places, the home”); id. at 569 (“Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced
against consenting adults acting in private.”); id. at 578 (distinguishing Lawrence from other factual
settings where states could presumably regulate sexuality, including “public conduct or prostitution”).
36
Id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”).
37
Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 44–49.
38
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model and Supreme
Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 197 (1996) (observing that “the
impact of public opinion is most pronounced for the more moderate justices”).
39
See Adam Liptak, Gay Vows, Repeated from State to State, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2009, at
WK1, available at LEXIS news library, NYT file (“When the Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas in
2003, struck down a Texas law making homosexual sex a crime, public support for same-sex
marriage—a question not directly implicated by the decision—dropped sharply.”).
40
See id. (“Five months [after Lawrence], the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued its
decision allowing same-sex marriages, causing public support for such marriages to fall further. It did
not recover to pre-Lawrence levels until 2005.”).
41
See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v.
Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1511 (2006) (“Conservative
groups reached out to supporters [following Lawrence and Goodridge] with a sense of urgency and
determination because, as they saw it, the institution of marriage was in great peril. These groups were
quite successful in encouraging scores of conservatives across the nation to organize and become
politically involved on the issue of marriage.”).
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issue in the 2004 election by proposing a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage.42 Conservatives introduced similar measures
in state legislatures.43 Although the federal amendment effort failed, many
political commentators believe that opposition to same-sex marriage
caused a surge in voter participation among social conservatives,
particularly in key swing states where voters considered initiatives banning
same-sex marriage on Election Day 2004.44 Thus, the backlash to samesex marriage could have possibly secured Bush’s reelection.
In order to avoid setbacks such as the 2004 anti-gay backlash, GLBT
activists must locate and exploit political opportunities for national and
local policy reform. This approach necessarily requires GLBT activists to
resist assuming that a broadened landscape for change exists merely due to
the success of Democrats in the 2008 election cycle.
III. RED VICTORIES AND BLUE EUPHORIA: AN ELECTION IS NOT A
SOCIAL MOVEMENT
A. Liberal Enthusiasm for Progressive Change
The Democratic candidates took contradictory stances on questions of
GLBT rights during the 2008 election. Because progressives are an
important base within the Democratic Party, the party’s candidates needed
to take liberal positions on GLBT rights. Nevertheless, public opposition
to same-sex marriage and the successful manipulation of this issue by
President Bush in 2004 caused Democratic candidates to oppose marriage
equality, even as they expressed support for other GLBT issues.
None of the leading Democratic presidential contenders supported the
legalization of same-sex marriage.45 President Barack Obama stated that
he opposes same-sex marriage, but that he supports equal “benefits” for
same-sex couples.46 It appears, however, that Obama may have indeed
expressed support for same-sex marriage during his 1996 campaign for a
seat in the Illinois legislature.47
42
Id. at 1512–13 (discussing President Bush’s support of constitutional prohibition of same-sex
marriage).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1515 (“Furthermore, the conventional wisdom immediately after the election was that
issues of values and morality in general, and same-sex marriage in particular, played an important role
in the presidential race, especially in Ohio, the state that ended up deciding the election.”) (citation
omitted).
45
Ben Smith, Dem Hopefuls Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, POLITICO, Aug. 10, 2007,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5320.html.
46
Perry Bacon Jr., Democratic Candidates Address Gay Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2007, at
A7, available at LEXIS news library, WPOST file.
47
Jason Linkins, Obama Once Supported Same-Sex Marriage ‘Unequivocally’, HUFFINGTON
POST, Jan. 1, 2003, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/13/obama-once-supported-same_n_
157656.html.
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Despite his current opposition to same-sex marriage, Obama has said
that he opposes efforts within states, such as California’s Proposition 8, to
define marriage in heterosexual terms.48 Obama also stated during his
presidential campaign that he opposes and would seek (if elected) the
repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” (DADT).49
Despite these contradictory positions, GLBT rights groups strongly
endorsed Democratic candidates. Democrats generally have much better
voting records on GLBT equality issues.50 Furthermore, because many
GLBT individuals support Democrats and because most liberals support
GLBT rights, GLBT social movements will likely have greater
opportunities for success if they press Democratic politicians, rather than
Republicans, for legal change.
The electoral success of the Democratic candidates—especially
President Obama—has caused many liberals to embrace the possibility of
fundamental progressive change. The Democratic primaries had already
created the foundation for these arguments. The progressive Left argued
that Obama was the preferred candidate who could move the party away
from “triangulation” and moderate politics.51 Many liberals also believed
that the election of a black candidate would substantially alter the status of
United States race relations and even usher in a post-racial society.52
After Obama defeated McCain, including wins in several southern
states, many commentators argued that his election marked a fundamental
shift in the nation’s ideological makeup. A new “Great Society Coalition”
of traditionally liberal people of color, educated professionals, women,
48

John Wildermuth, Obama Opposes Ban on Gay Marriage, S.F. CHRON., July 2, 2008, at A1,
available at LEXIS news library, SFCHRN file.
49
See, e.g., Civil Rights, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2009) (listing Obama’s opposition to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and DOMA’s
unequal distribution of benefits to GLBT versus heterosexual couples). Recently, however, the
Department of Justice defended the constitutionality of DOMA, despite Obama’s stated opposition to
the law. See http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/motion_memo_dismiss_filed.pdf.
50
See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, CONGRESSIONAL SCORECARD: MEASURING SUPPORT FOR
EQUALITY IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 4–14, http://www.hrc.org/documents/Congress_Scorecard110th.pdf (discussing voting records of Congressional democrats on “gay” issues).
51
Obama received endorsements from several progressive organizations. See MoveOn.org,
MoveOn Endorsement Throw Progreessive Weight Behind Barack Obama, http://moveon.org/press/pr/
obamaendorsementrelease.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009); ProChoiceAmerica.com, NARAL ProChoice America Endorses Sen. Barack Obama, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/elections/electionpr/pr_05042008_obamaendorsement.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). Obama also defeated Hillary
Clinton among “self-described liberal” voters. See Jennifer Parker, Obama Big Winner in N.C.,
Clinkton Ekes Out Ind. Win, ABC NEWS, May 7, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
Story?id=4802414&page=1 (“Obama has typically fared better among younger voters, people with
higher-education, self-described liberals, and African Americans.”).
52
Paul Street, Barack Obama’s White Appeal and the Perverse Racial Politics of the Post-Civil
Rights Era, DISSIDENT VOICE, June 16, 2007, http://dissidentvoice.org/2007/06/barackobama%E2%80%99s-white-appeal-and-the-perverse-racial-politics-of-the-post-civil-rights-era/
(arguing that Obama appealed to whites who want to submerge issues of prolonged racial inequality).
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gays and lesbians, and younger voters would use its electoral power to
place liberal Democrats in state and national offices and to secure the
passage of progressive policies that would substantially alter American
politics.53
Liberal commentators have also begun to eulogize the Republican
Party and social conservatism. Even before Obama’s victory, New York
Times columnist Frank Rich opined that “the G.O.P. looks more like a
nostalgic relic than a national political party in contemporary America. A
cultural sea change has passed it by.”54 Rich predicted that a “national rout
in 2008 just may be that Republican Party’s last stand.”55
Following the election, Jonathan Alter of Newsweek wrote a similarly
hopeful, but more guarded, column called “We’re Heading Left Once
Again.”56 Alter asserts that Obama “would have a fighting chance to move
the country to a new place, or at least one we haven’t seen for a while.
Leftward ho!”57
Richard Cohen, a writer for the Washington Post, encouraged liberals
to “Party Like It’s 1964.”58 Cohen asserted that Bush and McCain have
“constructed a mean, grumpy, exclusive, narrow-minded and altogether
retrograde Republican Party.”59 Accordingly, the GOP has earned its fate:
life in the “political wilderness.”60
Following the election, New Republic writer John Judis welcomed the
return of “America the Liberal.”61 Judis argued that:
The rise of [women, people of color, and professional
liberals] within the post-industrial economy has brought in its
wake a new political worldview. Call it “progressive” or
“liberal” or even “Naderite”. . . . [P]rofessionals are the
vanguard of the new progressive majority. Their sensibility
is reflected in the Democratic platform and increasingly in
the country as a whole. . . . Professionals are generally liberal
on civil rights and women’s rights; committed to science and
53
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to the separation of church and state; internationalist on trade
and immigration; skeptical of, but not necessarily opposed to,
large government programs; and gung-ho about government
regulation of business, especially K Street lobbyists.
Many are children of the 1960s and ‘70s—heavily
influenced by Martin Luther King Jr., Betty Friedan, Gloria
Steinem, and Nader—but their views are clearly reflected in
succeeding generations of college-educated Americans,
particularly the “millennials” who grew up during the
administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
UCLA’s annual study of incoming college freshmen across
the country found in 2006 that 28.4 percent identified
themselves as “liberal”—the highest percentage since 1975.62
Judis also contends that, while Bush exploited terrorism to implement
laws and policies that restrained civil liberty, “seven years removed from
September 11, liberal views have re-emerged with a vengeance. Now, the
coming recession seems likely to push voters even further left.”63
B. Warning Signs: Kinks in the Narrative of Liberal Dominance
Several kinks immediately emerged in the political landscape that
would test the enthusiasm among progressives concerning the prospect for
change. First, on the night of Obama’s victory, California passed
Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment that reverses a ruling of the
California Supreme Court which invalidated the state’s prohibition of
same-sex marriage.64 Although Obama won the state by more than twenty
percentage points, the largest margin of any candidate since World War
II,65 Proposition 8 garnered support from a slight majority of voters. The
conservative measure also performed comfortably within black and Latino
communities,66 whose support for Obama greatly exceeded his support
among other voters in the state.67
Also, the presidential election returns revealed that Obama failed to
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68

win a majority of white votes nationally, repeating an unbroken trend for
Democratic presidential contenders that began after the 1964 election (and
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).69 Obama also failed to win
a majority of white votes in eleven “blue states,” and he only won a slight
majority of white votes in five other blue states, including California,
Connecticut, and his home state of Illinois.70 Furthermore, black and
Latino voters fueled Obama’s victory in key states that other Democrats
had lost in recent elections, including Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Florida,
Virginia, Indiana and North Carolina.71 McCain, by contrast, received
votes primarily from whites and men, and more specifically from white
men.72 Thus, rather than proving the liberal idea that the United States has
transcended race, voter behavior in the 2008 presidential election suggests
that racial and gender cleavages remain important elements of the nation’s
political and social culture.
C. Split Ticket: GLBT Rights and the New Democratic Dominance
The passage of Proposition 8 caused an immediate rift in liberal
celebrations of Obama’s election victory. Many supporters of same-sex
marriage protested the passage of Proposition 8 and criticized blacks,
Latinos, and white religious voters who supported the measure.73 These
divisions, however, predated the passage of Proposition 8.
Even many pro-GLBT advocates remain conflicted over same-sex
marriage. The marriage equality movement, as several critics have
observed, suffers because it privileges nuclear family arrangements,
accepts the problematic conditioning of important social resources (like
health care) upon marriage, marginalizes the poor and people of color by
68
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advocating marital households as the most desirable settings for
childrearing, and stigmatizes gay male sexuality by describing marital sex
as optimal and suggesting that marriage could harness gay men’s sexual
passions and “civilize” them.74 Despite these important concerns, marriage
equality remains fundamentally an argument about the inappropriateness of
state action that sanctions, facilitates or manifests heterosexism. The
prohibition of same-sex marriage rests on pernicious stereotypes of GLBT
individuals and upon the privileging of heterosexuality.75 As such, despite
the limitations and problems of the same-sex marriage movement, the
attainment of marital equality represents a valid—yet often overvalued—
dimension of GLBT social movements.
Recent opinion polls, however, demonstrate that nearly 70% of the
nation opposes the legalization of same-sex marriage.76 Moreover, the
passage of Proposition 8 demonstrates that this opposition extends to even
the bluest jurisdictions—not only to deeply conservative areas of the
country. Many political commentators—and perhaps GLBT social
movement actors themselves—failed to appreciate the ideological diversity
of Democratic voters. Their lack of understanding of this issue prevented
them from engaging in the specialized activism and outreach that could
have potentially diminished support for the discriminatory constitutional
amendment among persons of color.77
The United States electorate holds diverse political viewpoints. Even
voters who traditionally favor one political party or candidate over another
do not necessarily share the same positions on substantive issues, and even
if they reach similar positions they may do so for different reasons. Blacks
and Latinos tend to support Democratic candidates because of the party’s
stronger support for civil rights and economic justice relative to the
Republican Party, but these groups often endorse socially conservative
positions on issues such as abortion and GLBT rights.78 The influence of
74
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religion in black and Latino communities explains these groups’ embrace
of social conservatism.
Nevertheless, many blacks and Latinos
compromise their views on socially conservative issues in order to endorse
Democratic candidates. By contrast, white evangelicals tend to prioritize
socially conservative issues in their electoral decisions, which explains
their support for Republican candidates, despite the GOP’s general
opposition to progressive class and labor policies that could benefit poor
whites.79
The inclusion of Proposition 8 on the California ballot did not require
blacks and Latinos to engage in political compromise: They could vote for
Obama and vote to ban same-sex marriage. And they did so in great
numbers. Up to 70% of black voters and 53% of Latino voters supported
Proposition 8,80 while over 94% and 74% of these groups voted for
Obama, respectively.81 Although some surveys show much smaller black
support for Proposition 8,82 the two groups nevertheless “split” their tickets
by endorsing the “liberal” candidate while embracing the conservative
position on same-sex marriage.
Although many persons within the GLBT community responded to
these statistics by condemning black and Latino voters, their anger was
somewhat misplaced. First, singling out blacks and Latinos obscures the
broader support for the measure across racial groups. Second, the racial
narrative fails to appreciate the importance of religion in shaping support
for the measure. Religiosity—not race—was the strongest factor that
determined whether or not a voter supported the measure, and black and
Latino support for Proposition 8 turned primarily on religiosity.83
Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected Officials, 9 ASIAN L.J. 41, 57 (2002) (“In the
general population, Latinos identified themselves as predominantly moderate to conservative. . . . This
apparent difference between the leaders and the led may not be as great as it appears at first glance
because most Latinos self-identify themselves as socially conservative, but support a liberal social
agenda.”).
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Nevertheless, race is not entirely irrelevant to the analysis. Pro-GLBT
and antiracist groups suffer from strained relations, despite the fact that
both groups could benefit from the strengthening of antidiscrimination law
and policy.84 Culturally, homophobia within communities of color and
racism among white GLBT people account for much of the conflict. Also,
many persons of color believe that despite the historical progress on
questions of civil rights, the law has not eliminated structural causes of
inequality.85 Blacks fear that including other categories of protection in
civil rights law will diminish attention paid to their vulnerable status.
By contrast, GLBT advocates often invoke racial analogies to argue
that gays and lesbians should receive the same civil rights protection that
blacks and other persons of color already enjoy. The analogy represents a
legitimate effort to generate empathy for victims of homophobia and to
navigate a legal culture that favors arguments rooted in precedent. This
approach, however, fuels conflict between the two groups because people
of color disagree with the implication that the law already sufficiently
protects them from discrimination and inequality, and their own
stereotypes of GLBT people causes them vehemently to resist
comparisons of heterosexism and racism.86
D. Obama’s Big Tent: Rick Warren and GLBT Rights
The discontent among GLBT individuals over the success of
Proposition 8 increased after Obama selected conservative minister Rick
Warren to deliver the invocation at his inauguration.87 Warren is a bestselling author of The Purpose Driven Life and the minister at the
Saddleback Church in Lake Forest, California.88 He is a popular
evangelical with a reputation for embracing humanitarian causes, but who,
nevertheless, holds clearly conservative positions on social issues.89
Warren campaigned in favor of California Proposition 8—although he
recently denied doing so.90 Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, Warren
stated during an interview that in addition to opposing same-sex marriage,
he does not support incestuous marriage, marriages between adults and
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children, and polygamy.
He later said that he views all of these
“relationships,” including same-sex marriage, as moral equivalents.92
The Human Rights Campaign, the nation’s largest advocate for GLBT
rights, sent an “Open Letter” to Obama, criticizing him for inviting Warren
to speak at the inauguration.93 In the face of a growing political furor,
Obama issued a public statement defending his invitation to Warren.
Obama said that including Warren in the inauguration would bolster his
effort to reach across the aisle and include all voices at the table:
I’ve . . . said . . . that it is important for America to come
together, even though we may have disagreements on certain
social issues. . . . [W]e’re not going to agree on every single
issue, but what we have to do is to be able to create an
atmosphere . . . where we can disagree without being
disagreeable and then focus on those things that we hold in
common as Americans.
During the course of the entire inaugural festivities, there
are going to be a wide range of viewpoints that are presented.
And that’s how it should be, because that’s what America’s
about. That’s part of the magic of this country, is that we are
diverse and noisy and opinionated.94
Obama’s explanation for selecting Warren obscures the fact that the
vast majority of the public—including Obama himself—opposes the
legalization of same-sex marriage. A CBS poll released in June 2008 finds
that only 30% of Americans favor legal recognition of same-sex
marriage.95 Another 28% favor “civil unions,” while 36% oppose any
legal recognition of same-sex intimate relationships.96 The poll shows the
greatest level of support for same-sex marriage since 2004 when CBS
began surveying public opinion on this issue.97 The paltry number of
Americans who endorse same-sex marriage actually represents an
improvement over the recent past.
Public opinion on this subject varies slightly with political party
91
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affiliation, but strong majorities of both major parties oppose same-sex
marriage. The poll finds that only 36% of Democrats and 14% of
Republicans support the legalization of same-sex marriage.98 Similarly,
only 34% of independent voters support same-sex marriage.99 Other major
polling data confirm these results.
Given the nature of public opinion, no major presidential candidate
endorsed the legalization of same-sex marriage.100 Democrats Barack
Obama, Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, Joe Biden, and Bill Richardson101
and Republicans Rudolph Giuliani, Fred Thompson, Mitt Romney,102 John
McCain, Mike Huckabee,103 and Ron Paul104 all opposed same-sex
marriage during their presidential campaigns. Advocates of Proposition 8
made computerized calls to black voters that broadcast Obama’s public
statements expressing his personal opposition to same-sex marriage
(despite his opposition to Proposition 8).105
Because Obama, Warren, and the vast majority of Americans oppose
the legalization of same-sex marriage, Warren’s participation in the
inauguration did not augment the diversity of political viewpoints. Instead,
Warren’s presence allowed Obama to portray himself as either a moderate
or “agreeable” progressive so that he could maximize political support for
his policies and reelection bid. Although this is a smart political strategy
for President Obama, it leaves open the question of the extent to which this
approach will shape actual policy on GLBT rights. Furthermore, if Obama
has accurately read the political pulse of the nation in deciding to pick an
anti-gay speaker for his inauguration, then GLBT social movements must
consider what role, if any, marriage politics can play in national equality
debates. The Warren controversy likely reveals that national politicians
can safely oppose same-sex marriage, even if some local politicians
cannot.
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IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVISM IN AN OBAMA ERA
A. The Success of Same-Sex Marriage in Liberal Jurisdictions Should Not
Dictate Nationwide Political Activity
Because most of the public disapproves of same-sex marriage, GLBT
equality movements must carefully consider when and where to press for
reform. Presently, pro-GLBT activists have pursued a smart strategy that
seeks judicial or legislative recognition of same-sex marriage in liberal
states that already have substantial laws and policies that prohibit
discrimination against GLBT individuals.
The achievement of same-sex marriage in Connecticut and other
liberal states, however, will not necessarily lead to similar rulings in
federal courts and in states that do not have established legal traditions
protecting GLBT individuals from discrimination. Although national
opinion polls demonstrate that the public strongly disfavors same-sex
marriage, in Connecticut, a slight majority of the public supports same-sex
marriage.106 The divided Kerrigan decision mirrors the closely divided
political opinion on the subject within the state. And while Governor Jodi
Rell initially aligned with Republicans and opposed same-sex marriage,
she has publicly stated that she does not oppose the Kerrigan decision and
that she will not launch an effort to reverse the ruling by constitutional
amendment.107
The GLBT political strategy of keeping marriage equality litigation
and legislation within the state system mirrors the successful approach that
social movements pursued after the Bowers decision. By engaging in
political action that substantially altered the legal status of GLBT people
and public opinion on gay rights issues across the nation, GLBT social
movements created a political opportunity for the Supreme Court to
invalidate sodomy laws in Lawrence.108 The pursuit of same-sex marriage
in state and local politics could ultimately result in federal recognition of
marriage equality. Given the substantial public opposition to the legal
recognition of same-sex marriage, however, GLBT social movement actors
should continue advancing this particular equality concern primarily within
state and local political and judicial venues.

106
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B. National Political Opportunities
Since Obama’s inauguration, GLBT social movements have also
pursued a sophisticated federal or national strategy that involves placing
pressure on President Obama to embrace GLBT equality and to seek
judicial relief in areas where public opinion would likely support court
rulings that favor GLBT litigants. Specifically, GLBT social movement
actors have attempted to highlight the unequal distribution of federal
benefits and employment, and they have largely avoided efforts to legalize
same-sex marriage as a matter of federal law or court doctrine.
For example, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), the
organization that litigated Goodridge, has filed a federal lawsuit on behalf
of 15 gay and lesbian individuals from Massachusetts.109 The litigation
challenges the constitutionality of DOMA.110 All of the plaintiffs became
legally married in Massachusetts following Goodridge. DOMA however,
defines “marriage” in heterosexual terms for purposes of federal law.111
Consequently, same-sex married partners do not qualify for federal
benefits or rights that normally attach to marriage. Accordingly, same-sex
married partners cannot jointly file federal taxes, do not qualify for
survivor benefits under social security or federal pensions, cannot include a
spouse in a health plan for federal workers, and do not qualify for many
other federal rights and privileges reserved for married individuals.
Although many of these benefits should not rest exclusively—if at all—on
marriage, DOMA explicitly discriminates against “married” GLBT
individuals and therefore presents serious constitutional questions.
The Massachusetts plaintiffs seek only to invalidate DOMA’s
restriction of federal benefits to opposite-sex couples.112 They have not
asked the court to rule that prohibiting same-sex marriage violates the
Constitution.113 The fact that the case does not seek “marriage” rights, but
only federal benefits, could make it politically “safe.” Because the vast
majority of the public disagrees with the legalization of same-sex marriage,
it is unlikely that a court—especially the conservative Supreme Court—
would issue a ruling striking down laws that prohibit same-sex marriage.114
The litigation also implicates economic rights and benefits, which
could enjoy wider public support due to the severe economic downturn.
109
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1738C (2000) (prohibiting same-sex marriage) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining “marriage”)).
111
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The 2008 elections turned in large part on the negative performance of the
economy under the stewardship of President Bush.115 GLAD carefully
chose plaintiffs whose experiences, as stated in a press release, could
appeal to public vulnerability during the current economic crisis. The
plaintiffs include:
Nancy Gill (51) and Marcelle Letourneau (47) of
Bridgewater: Nancy has been a postal worker for more than
21 years, but as a federal employee she is unable to provide
for Marcelle the health benefits that her co-workers’ spouses
readily receive. Nancy and Marcelle have 2 children. . . .
Melba Abreu (53) and Beatrice Hernandez (47) of
Boston: Both Cuban-Americans, they are unable to file
federal tax returns jointly and lose thousands of dollars each
year. Because of that inequity, their dream of owning their
own business has been deferred. . . .
Herbert Burtis (78) of Sandisfield: Herb, a 78-year-old
musician and teacher, lost his spouse after 60 years together,
including the last 13 when John battled Parkinson’s disease.
Herb’s already limited income is severely reduced because he
is denied the $700 month that would come with Social
Security survivor benefits. . . .
Randell Lewis-Kendell (52) of Harwich Port: Randy
lost Rob, his spouse and partner of 30 years, to cancer in
2007. A shopkeeper on Cape Cod, Randy struggled to pay
for Rob’s funeral expenses because the federal government
denied him the $255 benefit it provides all other bereaved
spouses. When Randy turns 60, he will not be eligible for
Rob’s higher Social Security benefit. . . .116
Another interesting political dimension of the anti-DOMA litigation
concerns President Obama, whose position on the subject has been
somewhat inconsistent. During his campaign for Senate in 2004, Obama
wrote a letter to the Windy City Times—a GLBT-themed newspaper in
Chicago—that takes a firm stance supporting gay rights issues. In the
letter, Obama says he has always opposed DOMA, and he promises to vote
to repeal the statute if elected:
For the record, I opposed DOMA [the Defense of
115
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Exit Polls Link Obama Victory to Economic Fears, NPR.ORG, Nov.
4, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96599102.
116
Press Release, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, GLAD Files Lawsuit Challenging
Denial of Critical Federal Benefits to Married Same-Sex Couples (Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/press-releases/2009-03-03-DOMA.pdf.
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Marriage Act] in 1996. It should be repealed and I will vote
for its repeal on the Senate floor. I will also oppose any
proposal to amend the U.S. Constitution to ban gays and
lesbians from marrying. This is an effort to demonize people
for political advantage, and should be resisted. . . .117
Although the 2004 letter states that Obama opposed the enactment of
DOMA in 1996 and that he would vote to repeal it, a few months earlier in
2003, Obama completed a candidate’s questionnaire in which he stated that
he did not support the repeal of DOMA.118 In 2007, Bill Burton, a
campaign spokesperson, tried to explain the shift, saying that “after hearing
from gay friends who relayed to Obama how hurtful it was for the bill to
be law, Obama supported its repeal.”119 But this does not explain how he
could oppose DOMA in 1996, support it in 2003, and oppose it in 2004.
During his presidential campaign, Obama took a position favoring the
“complete repeal” of DOMA, including the clause that purports to
authorize states to deny full faith and credit to same-sex marriages valid
under the laws in other states.120 But in 2004, he stated that the full faith
and credit clause does not require a state to honor out-of-state marriages
that its own law prohibits.121
As for his current position, the WhiteHouse.Gov website contains the
following language regarding DOMA:
Obama also believes we need to repeal the Defense of
Marriage Act and enact legislation that would ensure that the
1,100+ federal legal rights and benefits currently provided on
the basis of marital status are extended to same-sex couples
in civil unions and other legally-recognized unions. These
rights and benefits include the right to assist a loved one in
times of emergency, the right to equal health insurance and
other employment benefits, and property rights.122
This position, which supports the equal provision of federal benefits to
117
Letters: Obama on Marriage; Gay Games, WINDY CITY TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/gay/lesbian/news/ARTICLE.php?AID=4018
(ellipses
in
original).
118
Posting of Chris to Citizen Crain, http://citizenchris.typepad.com/citizenchris/
2007/06/a_gay_oopsie_fo.html (June 6, 2007, 7:23 EST).
119
Id.
120
Would Obama Position Spread Same Sex Marriage?, Aug. 10, 2007, available at
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2007/08/would-obama-pos.html.
121
Id.
122
WhiteHouse.gov, The Agenda: Civil Rights, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/civil_rights/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009). During the final editing of this Article, the White House website was
amended to delete language indicating that Obama favors the repeal of DOMA. See WhiteHouse.gov,
Issues: Civil Rights, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil_rights/. Subsequently, the Obama
administration submitted a brief in a California litigation which defends the constitutionality of
DOMA. See DOJ brief, supra note 49.
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same-sex and opposite-sex married couples, is precisely the litigants’
argument in the Massachusetts lawsuit. Accordingly, the case could test
Obama’s position on the subject. If Obama believes that DOMA is
abhorrent and that it should be repealed, then presumably he could direct
Attorney General Holder to seek a resolution of the case (such as a stay or
settlement) while he works with Congress to repeal the statute.
GLBT social movements could also seek the implementation of
employment protections, such as the Employment Nondiscrimination Act
(EDNA)123 and the repeal of DADT—the controversial policy that
prohibits openly gay and lesbian individuals from serving in the military.124
President Obama has already expressed opposition to DADT, and he also
supports ENDA.125 Social movement activity that focuses on employment
discrimination during a time of high unemployment might generate greater
public support.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kerrigan decision, along with court rulings in Massachusetts and
Iowa and legislation in New Hampshire and Vermont, indicates evolution
on the issue of GLBT equality. GLBT social movements have pursued an
effective strategy that seeks judicial and legislative recognition of samesex marriage in liberal states in order to reshape the legal and political
landscape of GLBT rights prior to advocating the issue in federal courts or
in Congress.126 This is the same legal strategy that social movements
employed in order to alter the legal status of GLBT persons after the
Bowers decision. This strategy played a large role in the Supreme Court’s
eventual invalidation of sodomy laws.
Connecticut is not a “bellwether” state on the subject of same-sex
marriage. Unless liberal social movements carefully choose what issues to
pursue in national politics and which ones to advocate in state and local
jurisdictions, they could provoke a massive political backlash against
GLBT rights. Given the strong public opposition to same-sex marriage,
this issue seems appropriately pursued in state courts and legislatures. But
the widespread public vulnerability due to the current economic crisis
might present political opportunities for GLBT social movements to press
123
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing a
Federal prohibition of discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity).
124
10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (prohibiting any homosexual or bisexual person from disclosing his or
her sexual orientation while serving in the United States armed forces).
125
WhiteHouse.gov, supra note 122.
126
During the completion of this Article, famous litigators David Boies and Ted Olson filed a
lawsuit on behalf of California residents which argues that Proposition 8 violates the federal
Constitution because it denies due process and equal protection to gays and lesbians. See
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30955704/. The filing of this lawsuit, which has angered many GLBT
advocates, id., goes squarely against the analysis of this Article.
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issues that are more pointedly linked to economic health and which do not
as easily provoke moralistic and religious opposition. Social movement
activity that highlights employment discrimination and denial of important
federal benefits, for example, might engender greater public support for
GLBT equality during a time of great economic distress. Litigation that
challenges DOMA’s denial of federal benefits to legally married same-sex
couples places the issue of GLBT economic vulnerability in public
discourse.
Finally, GLBT social movement actors must resist believing that the
success of Democratic politicians will necessarily translate into “victories”
for GLBT causes. The passage of Proposition 8 despite Obama’s historic
victory in California demonstrates that Democratic voters take complicated
positions (like all other voters) and that they can embrace social
conservatism and vote for liberal candidates. The controversy surrounding
Rick Warren demonstrates that Democratic politicians will cater to
moderate or even conservative interests if doing so could benefit them
politically. The Obama administration’s recent decision to defend the
constitutionality of DOMA also demonstrates that political calculations
will continue to lead “liberal” politicians to embrace conservative
positions. Social conservatism and triangulation among Democrats can
lead to conflict and political losses, but social movment strategies that take
into account the complex political choices of voters and politicians could
help to diminish or prevent such setbacks in the future.

